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Responsible research and innovation between “New Governance” and fundamental rights
Simone Arnaldi, Guido Gorgoni, Elena Pariotti
Introduction: Governing technologies under uncertainty 
conditions1
Academic literature and public debates alike have increasingly acknowledged the pervasiveness
of uncertainty in science, technology and their governance. Uncertainty is no longer viewed as a
residual  area  of  ignorance  and  risk  to  be  gradually  reduced  by  way  of  increasing  expert
knowledge and enhancing technological control. On the contrary, uncertainty is viewed as the
unavoidable  consequence  of  the  interaction  of  technology  with  its  environment,  that  is,  of
technology’s  ecological  nature  (Luhmann  1993).  As  an  effect  of  these  limitations  of  our
experimental  knowledge,  the introduction of new technologies  in society becomes a form of
“societal experimentation” (e.g. van de Poel 2009; Felt and Wynne 2007), and risks and possible
developments  can  be  detected  only  after  technologies  have  been  introduced  in  and  have
displayed  their  impacts  on  society.  Notions  like  “manufactured  risk”  (Giddens  1999)  or
“secondary consequences” (Beck 1992) were introduced to interpret this paradoxical relationship
between increased contingency and the unprecedented knowledge about and control of social life
and the physical world, characterizing new and emerging technologies.  Indeed, the increased
manipulative  knowledge  of  nature  and  society  produces  uncertainty  rather  than  reducing  it
(Coeckelbergh 2012).
The boundaries  of  science  and policy,  knowledge and values  are  redesigned by this  radical
uncertainty. Accepting that nature and society are co-produced (Jasanoff 2006; Pellizzoni 2010)
implies  the  acknowledgement  that  the  reception  of  scientific  knowledge,  technology
developments and their consequences “is never, and never can be, a purely intellectual process,
about reception of knowledge per se. People experience these in the form of material and social
relationships, interactions and interests, and thus they logically define and judge the risk, the risk
information,  or the scientific knowledge as part and parcel of that ‘social  package’” (Wynne
1992:  pp.  281–282).  Knowledge  and  technology,  therefore,  implicitly  incorporate  models,
worldviews and societal patterns (Wynne 1992), and, therefore, uncertain knowledge comes with
embattled  consent  where  the  governance  of  new  technologies  is  concerned  (Douglas  and
Wildavsky 1983: p. 6).
In this  chapter,  we argue that responsible research and innovation  (RRI) can be an effective
answer to this twofold uncertainty, so that responsiveness and the normative steering of research
and  innovation  acquire  more  importance  over  risk  individuation  and  management.  Our
hypothesis is that the models of governance currently in place and the governance framework
that is outlined in the literature and policy documents on RRI may be suitable to address the
uncertainty challenges, if some conditions are met, such as the ability of these models to properly
include the reference to normative dimensions, among which fundamental rights are the edge,
and to implement a certain idea of responsibility.
The following sections will first examine the diffusion of soft regulation as an answer to the
twofold  uncertainty  described  above,  which  is  addressed  by  leveraging  the  knowledge  pool
possessed by the regulatees and by integrating the divergence of values and interests through
cooperation and flexibility. After presenting some examples of soft regulatory initiatives from
nanotechnologies, the chapter frames these regulatory developments in the context of the New
Governance approach. A second part of the chapter briefly presents RRI in the broader context of
the evolution of responsibility paradigms. By referring to their characterization in terms of time
orientation  (prospective,  retrospective)  and  active/passive  attitude  to  responsibility,  three
paradigms (fault, risk and precaution) are distinguished. Then, RRI is presented as a proactive,
participative,  multidimensional  approach  to  responsibility  in  the  governance  of  STI  that  is
founded on the mutual commitments of societal actors, thus constituting a distinct paradigm on
its own. Drawing on these remarks, the meaning and relevance of fundamental rights in RRI is
assessed. Far from being a constraint on innovation and on the public debate of its trajectories,
fundamental rights are viewed as a catalyst of normative orientation  and public participation.
The  conclusions  observe  how  the  reference  to  fundamental  rights  makes  RRI  a  more
comprehensive approach when compared with New Governance, as it internalizes the problem of
the normative anchoring of decisions and of the consistency among different kinds of normative
elements.  Eventually,  it  is  noticed  that  the  potential  of  fundamental  rights  to  successfully
combine  normative  orientation  with  openness  and  flexibility  in  RRI  is  conditioned  by  the
capacity to design a governance framework that can ensure the complementarity between hard
and soft regulation, legal norms and voluntary commitments.
Soft regulation: General remarks and examples from 
nanotechnology
The  notion  of  “soft  regulation”  refers  to  a  broad  range  of  regulatory  instruments  such  as
guidelines and recommendations, resolutions, declarations, codes of practice and conduct. Soft
regulation  is  a  set  of explicit  rules which have either  a  non-binding character  or  are  utterly
voluntary  (Fredriksson et  al.  2012;  Skjærseth  et  al.  2006).  While  they  are acknowledged as
having  legal  relevance,  soft  norms  lack  the  formal  binding  effects  and  clearly  top-down
delineated  enforcement  mechanisms  that  are  typical  of  traditional  “command  and  control”
regulatory approaches (Shaffer and Pollack 2013).  Definitions like “non-legislative modes of
policy-making” (Hérriet,  in  Fredriksson  et  al.  2012: p.  53) or even “quasi-legal  instruments”
(Koutalakis et al. 2010: p. 330) have been introduced to capture this characteristic nature of soft
norms. As Dorbeck-Jung and Shelley-Egan notice (2013: p. 56), soft regulation describes a shift
“from direct intervention (‘rowing’) to indirect  intervention (‘steering’) in terms of enabling,
motivating and pressing the regulated parties to regulate and to comply with self-regulation”.
The prominence of soft regulation has increased as a consequence of three intersecting processes
(Arnaldi 2014). First,  globalization fundamentally reshaped the general context in which soft
regulation has established its significance. These changes challenged the previously uncontested
role of the State in setting domestic and international regulations, through command-and-control
mechanisms and the forms of international public law (Ferrarese 2000).
Second,  soft  regulation  represents  a  tool  that  regulators  have for  leveraging  the  information
advantages of those actors who are (or are being) regulated. In emerging technological fields that
are  characterized  by  a  high  degree  of  uncertainty,  regulators  have  insufficient  resources  or
information to define mandatory rules (Dorbeck-Jung and Shelley-Egan 2013). The effective
regulation of these areas often requires “frequently changing cognitive and material resources for
effective regulation, which state actors often do not have and lie with industry as the primary rule
target.  This  is  particularly  the  case  in  highly  technical  areas  where  the  state  depends  on
individual  producers  for  crucial  regulatory  information  related  to  product  characteristics  and
production  processes”  (Koutalakis  et  al.  2010:  p.  334).  Third,  uncertainty  drives  regulatory
decision-making towards “a more political  direction” (Falkner and Jaspers 2012). Regulatory
choices  become  more  “political”,  insofar  as  they  require  “the  weighing  up  of  sometimes
competing  values,  such  as  technology  promotion  versus  harm  prevention.  Scientific  risk
assessment criteria alone cannot guide regulators and policy-makers in such situations. Instead, a
wider  range  of  factors  enters  the  calculations  that  inform  regulatory  action,  from  political
ideology and societal  risk attitudes  to  national  or  sectorial  economic  interests”  (Falkner  and
Jaspers 2012). In this context, soft regulation is used to improve the legitimacy and sustainability
of regulatory decisions when “there is the need to build a participated consensus on legal and
political decisions” (Pariotti 2011: p. 516) and there is “little space for different and conflicting
interests to be articulated” (Garsten and Jacobsson 2011: p. 422).
The  coexistence  and  the  combination  with  hard  law create  “hybrid”  regulatory  frameworks
(Heyvaert 2009: pp. 649–650). “This happens when, for instance, a voluntary good practice code
is used as a benchmark for compliance with a ‘hard law’ prescription” (Heyvaert 2009: p. 650)
or,  on  the  contrary,  when  soft  regulatory  instruments  refer  to  hard  law  provisions.  On  the
international level,  soft regulatory processes are seen to combine inter-governmental,  shared-
sovereignty aims and non-governmental, civil society values (Hickey et al. 2006: p. 298).
In the nanotechnology field, soft regulatory solutions have been widely implemented and have
been  regarded  with  particular  interest  as  a  tool  for  the  international  harmonization  and
coordination of regulatory frameworks (Bowman and Hodge 2007;  Marchant  et al. 2009; see
Table  7.1 for some examples based on the level of the regulatory initiatives and the type of
initiator).2 The  European  Commission’s  Code  of  Conduct  for  responsible  nanosciences  and
nanotechnologies  (European  Commission  2008),  the  “Voluntary  Reporting  Scheme  for
Engineered  Nanoscale  Materials”  of  the  UK  Department  of  Environment,  Food  and  Rural
Affairs (DEFRA 2008a,  2008b), the voluntary “stewardship program” for nanoscale materials
under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) of the US Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA  n.d.),  the  Responsible  Nanocode  (NIA,  n.d.),  the  codes  of  conduct  and  assessment
frameworks developed by companies  like DuPont and BASF (DuPont 2012; BASF, n.d.)  or
broader initiatives  like ResponsibleCare© for the chemical  industry (Heinemann and Schäfer
2009,  ICCA  2006)  are  all  examples  of  initiatives  fostering  the  cooperative  and  voluntary
commitment of a variety of social actors, beyond mere legislative and regulatory compliance3.
Soft regulation and “New Governance”
This evolution in regulation has been seen as a part and consequence of the emergence of the so-
called “New Governance” model. The New Governance, which is also referred to as “distributed
governance”  (MASIS  2009),  “constructive  governance”  (Ozolina  2009)  or  “democratic
experimentalism” (Szyszcak 2006), is the model of governance that inspires, for example, the
“open method of coordination” among member States about the EU goals for social policies (and
social rights) (cf.  Trubeck and Trubeck 2007: pp. 12–16, for an illustration and a comparison
with the Classic Community Method). It rests on tools such as guidelines, periodic reporting,
multilateral  surveillance, exchange of best practices and social dialogue. As it relies on local
deliberation and stakeholder participation, it was meant to provide an answer to the democratic
deficit in EU (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006). As such, it is rightly inscribed in the broader
shift towards distributed, soft regulatory frameworks that we described in the previous section of
this chapter. Indeed, it does not rely solely on experts’ deliberation within European regulatory
agencies  or  committees,  but  “enables  stakeholders  to  participate  directly  in  decision-making
processes” (Eberlein and Kerwer 2004: p. 133).
As  is  widely  acknowledged,  the  turn  to  governance  in  policy-making  and  in  regulation
(Braithwaite, Coglianese and Levi-Faur, 2007) implies the following main elements: (1) a shift
in  situation  in  which  “the  government  is  a  relationship  of  negotiation  and cooperation  with
private  actors”  so  that  (Chowdhury  and  Wessel  2012:  p.  345)  (2)  rule/norm  making,  rule
implementation  and rule  enforcement  activities  are  dispersed “across different  administrative
levels both within and beyond nation state” (Chowdhury and Wessel 2012: p. 346) and (3) a
central  ordering  of  regulation  is  lacking.  In  this  framework,  the  “New Governance  model”
introduces  a  special  concern  for  public  engagement  and participation  as  one  of  its  essential
features.
It  can  be  said  that  the  New  Governance  model  integrates  principle-based  regulation  and
outcome-oriented regulation as an alternative to rule-based regulation.  It has a set of specific
features,  like  participation  and  power-sharing,  integration  of  different  levels  of  governance,
diversity  and  decentralization  and  expansion  of  the  space  for  stakeholders’  deliberation.
Furthermore,  its  features  of flexibility  and revisability  make it  experimental  and tentative  in
nature,  so  that  regulation  can  adapt  to  distinctive  economic,  environmental,  social  and
administrative  conditions  that  cannot  be  regulated  through  uniformly  binding  legislative
requirements  (Scott  and  Trubeck  2002;  Pariotti  2011),  thus  reducing  transaction  costs  of
regulators and regulatees (Koutalakis et al. 2010: p. 330).
In general,  this model is not immune from criticism and, again, nanotechnology represents a
significant example. Maynard and Rejeski (2009) contest the effectiveness of voluntary reporting
of nanomaterials by industry and support the adoption of mandatory measures.  Marchant and
Abbott (2013) point to the inconsistent and limited implementation of the existing international
soft  regulation  initiatives  for  nanotechnology  and of  their  impacts.  Stokes  (2013) notes  that
regulators prefer more conventional command-and-control methods of regulation in dealing with
considerable  uncertainties.  For  instance,  important  stakeholders  such as  the  European  Trade
Unions Confederations (ETUC) and political bodies such as the European Parliament have asked
for  stricter  and  more  specific  provisions,  especially  by  applying  the  existing  chemical  or
cosmetics regulations (ETUC 2008; 2010; European Parliament 2009; Ponce del Castillo 2013;
Ruggiu 2013) to nanotechnologies. In the US, the EPA undertook a step in a similar direction,
proposing in 2013 a mandatory reporting programme under the TSCA for several nanomaterials
(EPA, n.d.).
Indeed, the crucial challenge of “New Governance” arrangements is to strike a balance between
flexibility and efficacy, in terms of the behavioral orientation of the (self)-regulated parties. As
the examples  above show, the  critique  of  soft  regulation  tends  to  prefer  binding,  rule-based
regulation over the outcome-based approach that is typical of soft regulatory instruments, which
measures performance against regulatory goals rather than against rule compliance.
As stated in the introduction, we maintain that this complementarity is just the kind of result that
is pursued by the idea of RRI.  In order to support this  position,  we characterize RRI in the
context of the diversity and historical evolution of the notion of responsibility. This argument is
preliminary to discussing the interplay of the New Governance and fundamental rights vis a vis
the realization of RRI.
Responsible  research  and  innovation  as  a  new  paradigm  of
responsibility?
RRI aims at introducing responsibility into research and innovation processes at an early stage,
by involving those who are concerned with their consequences in the framing of the innovation
activities  and in  the  definition  of  their  aims and scopes.  In  this  perspective,  innovation  and
research  activities  might  be  characterized  as  “responsible”  according  to  the  ways  they  are
performed in a broad societal  perspective (van den Hoven  et al.  2013), more than under the
perspective  of  liability  or  compensation  for  damages,  as  well  as  under  the  traditional  risk
management approach.
As RRI claims to be a new approach to responsibility in science and innovation, the issue of
whether it has new features or whether it is yet another version of responsibility paradigms we
already  know  has  to  be  addressed.  In  particular,  it  should  be  questioned  whether  RRI
distinguishes significantly from the Precautionary Principle (PP) or not, as the inner logic of the
PP is also that of anticipating responsibility in scientific and technological innovation activities.
The idea of precaution stems from the new context of scientific uncertainty highlighted above
(see section 1),  to which neither  the preventive  approach of risk management  could provide
acceptable answers, nor the fault paradigm would help in making innovation processes more
responsible. Instead, it frames responsibility in terms of a duty of anticipating the undesirable
outcomes  of  techno-scientific  activities  through  value-centered  decisions  in  a  context  of
epistemic uncertainty.  The PP is based on the idea of a  preventive exercise  of responsibility
rather than on its subsequent ascription (be it via fault or risk management mechanisms): within
this  logic,  the focus of responsibility  is  on anticipating the potentially  harmful  outcomes  by
framing  responsibility  in  terms  of  value-balance  within  a  context-based  decision.  Indeed,
precaution  operates  precisely  where  adequate  guarantees  against  undesirable  harmful
consequences  of  scientific  innovation  cannot  be  provided  by applying the  general  rules  and
standards of risk management, so that the criteria for a responsible management of innovation
have to be set case by case. So it could be told that the PP operates a sort of a re-ethicization of
the responsibility idea, not because it introduces new figures of liability (nor new criteria of risk
assessment),  but  rather  because  it  shapes  legal  responsibility  in  a  way similar  to  an  ethical
judgment  in  situation  (Papaux  2006;  Gorgoni  2010),  as  it  asks  (and  prompts)  for  decision-
making in a context where the causal link between potentially harmful activities and the possible
threats  (be it  for  the human health  or  for  the  environment)  is  not  certain,  marking a  major
epistemic  break  with  the  epistemology  underpinning  typical  risk  management  techniques
(Osimani 2013).
Under this perspective, RRI shares the same epistemology with the PP, but it declines it in a
different way, as the lack of scientific certainty about potential harms not only should no longer
constitute an obstacle for taking preventive actions (like in the PP), but rather it gives way to a
proactive appraisal of a situation characterized by both cognitive uncertainty and some degree of
values indeterminacy.  What,  therefore,  specifically  characterizes  RRI as an approach distinct
from the  PP  is,  at  least  in  principle,  the  integration  of  responsibility  within  the  innovation
process itself. In other words, what makes RRI different from the PP is not its inner logic (that of
anticipation)  or  its  underlying  epistemology  (as  they both refer  to  decisions  in  a  context  of
uncertainty),  but  rather  its  contexts  and  conditions  of  application.  Indeed,  the  PP  has  been
invoked as a safeguard against the undesirable outcomes of innovation activities, serving as a
tool for correcting its path, either by inverting, diverting or blocking it (Callon, Lascoumes and
Barthe, 2009). Nevertheless, the PP remains linked to a context in which positions are confronted
in an adversarial logic, while RRI aims at changing the context in which precaution intervenes,
by shifting to a cooperative logic when decisions about the innovation trajectories are concerned.
Indeed, RRI promotes a logic of  responsibilization,  which has been broadly characterized as
“predisposing  actors  to  assume responsibility  for  their  action”  (Dorbeck-Jung,  Shelley-Egan
2013), but which – in RRI perspective – could and should be more explicitly characterized in
terms that predispose societal actors to voluntarily assume an early and shared responsibility for
the research and innovation processes by overcoming the perspective of the pure abiding by
duties or complying with rules.
For an RRI idea to represent something new, it is necessary giving value to these features and
taking out the consequences implied on those premises, which contain strong claims in terms of
principles but which may convert into nothing but a rhetorical appeal if they are not given credit
and their consequences taken into account and fully developed.
The novel features of RRI within existing responsibility models
In order to develop the features distinguishing RRI from other approaches highlighted above, it
is necessary to frame it within the context of the existing responsibility approaches. Instead of
detailing the different meanings of responsibility, as others have done (e.g. Davis 2012; van de
Poel 2011;  Vincent 2011;  Gorgoni 2011;  Ricoeur 2000;  Hart 1968), we propose to take into
account and examine the deep semantics underpinning the different meanings of responsibility,
which can be basically structured on the combinations between two different modes (passive and
active)  and two temporal  directions  (retrospective  and prospective).  We could  maintain  that
different meanings of responsibility are built on the combinations of these modes and these time
orientations. In the following pages, we will first characterize each of those modes, and then we
will analyse their combinations.
As for the first polarity highlighted, that between passive and active modes, the passive pole of
responsibility  corresponds to one of its  most common understandings,  i.e.  that  of a sanction
intended  in  a  broad  sense,  as  synonymous  of  holding  someone  responsible  for  something
(typically the legal imputation of liability), while the active pole of responsibility is also linked to
another common understanding of responsibility, the idea of “acting responsibly”, in the sense of
assuming  one’s  own  responsibilities  (self-ascription  of  responsibility),  whether  in  terms  of
specific duties or in terms of a relation of care for something or somebody. The passive and the
active modalities of responsibility are not mutually exclusive so that it is possible to highlight
some oscillations of the meaning of responsibility between those poles, which sometimes may be
conflicting with each other.
Indeed, if  we shift  from the passive towards the active modes,  responsibility  can be equally
understood in terms of 1) the obligation to bear the consequences of an action (liability, which is
essentially  passive);  2)  the  capacity  to  act,  taking  into  account  one’s  duties  (combining  the
passive pole of obligation and the active pole of capacity); and 3) the capacity to act, taking into
account the resulting consequences, even without necessarily referring to some pre-established
duties (which could be termed as a self-ascription of responsibility). Characterized in this latter
sense, the idea of responsibility has to be intended in terms of responsiveness more than in terms
of reaction.  Responsiveness expresses the idea of a response to somebody’s appeal (Pellizzoni
2004: p. 557), thus characterizing the active pole of responsibility in very different terms than the
passive one.
As for the second polarity highlighted above, the distinction between the active and the passive
modalities of responsibility entails, in its turn, some distinctions regarding the time orientation of
responsibility, namely the retrospective (backward-looking) (Bovens 1998) and the prospective
(forward-looking) one (Cane 2002;  Gorgoni  2008).  Retrospective responsibility  is  essentially
linked to the idea of an ex-post imputation of responsibility,  and so to the ideas of sanction
(liability), compensation (damage) or justification (accountability), which do shape the idea of
responsibility, essentially in terms of a reaction to a certain state of affairs. Responsibility, in this
case, is essentially backward-looking, i.e. past-oriented, and therefore can be characterized as
retrospective in that its key moment is the ex post evaluation of a situation and the subsequent
judgement in terms of the imputation of the consequences.
On  the  other  side,  prospective  responsibility  is  essentially  linked  to  the  idea  of  acting
responsibly, both in the sense of complying with the duties associated to someone role, but also
with the broader idea of (pro)actively assuming responsibilities, even when the contents of duties
and  tasks  are  not  or  cannot  be  established  in  advance.  These  features  make  the  idea  of
prospective responsibility more complex than that of a duty (with which it nevertheless tends to
be identified in the legal field), characterizing the idea of responsibility as prospective in that
responsibility is not a reaction to a certain state of affairs, but rather a projection over it.
Drawing on this discussion, the different models of responsibility can be framed as combinations
between  the  two  semantic  poles  and  the  two  time  dimensions  highlighted  above.  When
examining the historical  evolution  of the idea of responsibility,  following the suggestions of
François Ewald (2001), it is possible to point out three main paradigms of responsibility (which
can be clearly distinguished only at the theoretical and historical level, but whose different logics
nevertheless  are  coexisting,  overlapping  and  sometimes  competing  at  the  practical  level),
namely:  1)  the  paradigm  of  fault,  corresponding  to  the  traditional  moral  and  legal  idea  of
responsibility as a reaction to a certain state of affairs, and which is essentially retrospective (e.g.
Hart  1968);  2)  the  paradigm of  risk,  which  aims  at  guaranteeing  the  compensation  for  the
damages rather than the sanction of the fault,  by disconnecting indemnification from liability
(Beck 1992);  and 3)  the paradigm of  safety,  which is  linked to  the idea of  precaution as  a
reaction to the residual situation of uncertainty that cannot be domesticated by means of risk
calculation. Indeed, the two former paradigms of responsibility are seriously challenged by the
evolution of science and innovation, as they both presuppose either an identifiable author (fault)
or the possibility of relying on statistical data (risk).
Compared with those paradigms, RRI presents some distinctive features that we should briefly
analyze. Despite the differences in definitions between various authors dealing with the subject
(von Schomberg 2013;  Owen 2014;  van den Hoven et al. 2013;  Forsberg et al. 2015), we take
RRI as a single idea as, in our opinion, the literature on RRI shares some common understanding
of  responsibility,  namely  (in  no  particular  order)  1)  the  orientation  towards  future  of
responsibility,  advocating  for  a  prospective idea  of  responsibility  as  a  mean  of  steering  the
innovation processes according to societal values and needs; 2) the focus on proaction, as RRI is
intended to be mainly a  driving factor  of innovation process more than a constraint, engaging
responsibility beyond the strict boundaries of what is legally due; 3) the framing of responsibility
as a collective and participative process: not only is responsibility thought as being shared across
different actors, each of which has different roles and powers along the innovation process, but it
is also seen as a result of a collaborative process between the innovators and society as a whole;
and d) the crucial role of  voluntary instruments: RRI both promotes and implies collaborative
dynamics instead of typical dispute-settlement mechanisms (be it at the judicial level or not),
encouraging  the  creation  of  (commonly  agreed)  voluntary  standards  and  procedures.  So,
ultimately, according to the RRI idea, responsibility should be organized through norms both
adaptive (flexible) to the technological  development and committed to broader societal  goals
such as environmental, social and economic sustainability, the goal being to promote proactive
interventions in order to avoid or reduce any potential or even unforeseeable risk in cases of
scientific uncertainty.
If we give credit to its ambitions, and only if we do so, then RRI can perhaps be considered as a
new paradigm of responsibility, combining in a new way the elements of other responsibility
paradigms (see  Table  7.2 for an unavoidably simplified comparison) as it aims at  steering the
innovation process from the inside towards societal goals rather than coping with its (actual or
anticipated)  unwanted  and  unintended  externalities,  by  integrating  responsibility  within  the
innovation process itself. Despite the (at least partial) indeterminacy of societal goals and values
on which this approach is based, we maintain that a distinctive feature of RRI is its normative
commitment to the protection of fundamental rights (Arnaldi, Gorgoni and Pariotti 2016), which
sets it aside from regulatory approaches based on deregulation in a purely market-driven logic
(Arnaldi and Gorgoni 2016).
RRI and fundamental rights3
The  nature  of  RRI  as  a  conceptual  and  policy  approach  aimed  at  actors’  reciprocal
responsibilization defines a space for innovative forms of governance centred on the adoption
and the practical  implementation  of (self-)  regulatory  instruments  such as  codes  of conduct,
guidelines, technical standards, reporting and audits. As we have seen, these types of regulatory
instruments and their incorporation into hybrid regulatory schemes correspond to the features
that are key to the New Governance model, like participation and power sharing; integration of
different levels of governance,  diversity and decentralization; and expansion of the space for
stakeholders’ deliberation.
Yet, RRI directly addresses the question of defining the ultimate purposes of science, technology
and innovation by affirming the need to guarantee some essential features in order to be a truly
innovative and alternative approach to research and innovation governance (as indicated by the
switch from the logic of “science  and society” to that of “science  in society”,  marking their
reciprocal integration rather than their separation).
Under this perspective, it is therefore clear that RRI brings some strong normative requirements
in order to be both a coherent and innovative way of dealing with responsibility issues of the
research and innovation process.
While  a significant  part  of the literature  considers the definition of the ultimate purposes of
science, technology and innovation as the result of (normative) deliberations emerging from the
spontaneous interplay between science and society (Owen et al. 2013), the literature that is most
close to the EU policy environment from which the notion of RRI originated seems to include
more explicitly fundamental rights as the source of orientation of research and innovation (von
Schomberg 2013; Ozolina et al. 2009: p. 3).
In our view, this latter approach is better suited for configuring RRI as a more comprehensive
new approach to  the governance  of responsibility,  as  it  introduces  some explicit  “normative
anchor points” which are in line with the democratic guarantees that ultimately characterize the
RRI idea.
Indeed, in one of its most cited definitions, RRI is framed as “a transparent, interactive process
by which societal actors and innovators become mutually responsive to each other with a view to
the (ethical) acceptability, sustainability and societal desirability of the innovation process and its
marketable  products  (in  order  to  allow  a  proper  embedding  of  scientific  and  technological
advances in our society)” (Von Schomberg 2013: p. 50; 2014: p. 39). In this view, we agree on
affirming that ethical acceptability in the EU context “refers to a mandatory compliance with the
fundamental values of the EU Charter on fundamental rights” (von Schomberg 2013: p. 40).
Moreover, social desirability “captures the relevant, and more specific normative anchor points
of  the  treaty  on  the  European  Union”  (von  Schomberg  2013:  p.  40).  Under  this  view,
competitiveness,  scientific  progress,  fundamental  rights  and environmental  protection  can  be
taken as the normative anchor points of EU research and innovation policies and, therefore, it
seems reasonable  that  they  play  a  role  as  the  normative  “building-blocks”  of  a  governance
framework for Research and Innovation activities.
Indeed, RRI comprehensively combines and integrates various earlier approaches and methods,
as  “technology  assessment  and  foresight,  application  of  the  precautionary  principle,
normative/ethical  principles  to  design  technology,  innovation  governance  and  stakeholder
involvement and public engagement” in both deliberation and regulation (von Schomberg 2013:
p.  41).  RRI  complements  this  interest  in  the  design  and  implementation  of  governance
frameworks, understood as sets  of concrete  processes and mechanisms,  with the warranty of
compliance with normative requirements. On the other hand, however, the definition of RRI we
have cited emphasizes the integrated presence of multiple dimensions within the notion of RRI,
like the ethical, political, social and legal ones.
When these governance approaches are discussed, stressing the reference to fundamental rights
could be regarded as a way to rigidly set values and goals, even regardless of public debate and
public opinion development. From this point of view, fundamental rights could be considered as
normative constraints  defined in a top-down way, limiting the scope and influence of public
involvement. However, this representation of fundamental rights in general and of their specific
role in RRI is indeed debatable. Human rights are usually seen from two opposite perspectives
and both of them should be rejected. According to a first view, human rights are abstract ideals,
which easily can be reduced to rhetorical appeals. According to a different one, human rights are
expressed  by norms and,  because  of  that,  they  have  a  closed  and compelling  meaning  that
concerns solely the relationships between citizens and their governments or judicial courts. In
this understanding, fundamental rights have no relation to public opinion.
Fundamental rights can, on the contrary,  be thought of as claims that are justified by strong
moral reasons and supported by legal norms, suitable for regulating both the (vertical) relations
between the government and the citizens and, often, the (horizontal) relations among citizens
themselves and, in general, among private actors. However, it is important to note that the legal
norms supporting such claims are often structurally vague, because they have to apply to as high
a number of cases as possible.
In science,  technology and innovation many private  actors actively self-regulate  and possess
information and knowledge crucial to regulation, so regulation needs to reflect such a diffuse and
shared nature of responsibility.  As a consequence,  the contents of fundamental  rights should
emerge in a bottom-up fashion through a diffused meaning-making process which could, and
often does, also contribute to shaping self-regulatory tools.
Indeed, human rights do affect the regulation of innovation in several ways. First, on a judicial
level, by referring to the sources on fundamental rights in the EU, the judicial stance contributes
to the definition of the content of rights. Second, on a policy level, the protection and promotion
of rights might act as a driver for policy-making. Third, the reference to human rights plays a
role also on a horizontal  level,  between private actors,  such as, for instance,  when the most
diverse organizations adopt and implement social responsibility instruments (codes of conduct,
self-regulation).
Therefore, it is possible to maintain that fundamental rights are a basic reference for a normative
governance model and that, nevertheless, the development and implementation of such a model
should and can come to terms with different values and with different interpretations of the rights
themselves,  in  particular  within  the  European  context  where  “human  rights  can  help  in
strengthening  both  the  legislation  needed  for  regulating  the  present  market  and  the  soft
instruments needed for steering research and for fostering the stakeholders’ participation without
sacrificing the coherence of the regulatory response” (Ruggiu 2013: p. 201).
When understood in this way, human rights might gain a central space in RRI as they could
represent the “normative anchor points” for defining ethical acceptability, thus shaping what has
been regarded as the main feature of a specific European approach to the ethical and regulatory
challenges  of innovation  (Ozolina  et  al.  2009:  p.  27).  As we already mentioned,  normative-
flavored definitions of RRI explicitly link the ethical acceptability of research and innovation
and compliance with the EU charter on fundamental rights, besides a general reference to safety
as a paramount criterion for assessing technology and innovation (van den Hoven et al. 2013: p.
58). Moreover, innovation is expected to take into account the societal needs embodied in the
Treaty on European Union, as sustainable development,  equality and quality of life (van den
Hoven et al. 2013: p. 58). Yet, fundamental rights and societal needs are seen as explicitly and
mutually linked goals of a comprehensive normative framework for the governance of science,
technology and innovation. Nevertheless, despite their strong embedding within the EU Treaty
and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, it has to be recognized that some ambiguities can
exist among the “normative anchor points” themselves,  as conflicting interpretations,  uses or
applications might rise around them, and this is the reason why RRI frameworks should give
room to contestation as an unavoidable feature to be taken into account (e.g. see Res-AgorA
Project, Responsibility Navigator: http://responsibility-navigator.eu/).
To sum up, two remarks here are in order to justify an integrated view of fundamental rights and
governance.  First,  considering  fundamental  rights  as  essential  elements  of  a  governance
framework does not imply any closure to public involvement, as it does not mean that both the
normative standards to be complied with and the goals to be pursued are already fully set in a
top-down manner. Far from it: once listed, fundamental rights have to be filled with contents and
have to  be detailed  with regard to  specific  domains,  contexts  and cases.  In this  open-ended
process of interpretation and application of principles, societal values and norms can find (and
usually do find) a way of expression. Within this perspective, they can rather be seen as being “a
public normative practice” (Beitz 2009: p. 170), as long as their content is not established once
and for all in the law-making process, but it has to be  shaped also in a bottom-up manner by
several  relevant  actors  during  the  application  stage,  such  as  judges,  but  also  private  actors
creating  and  promoting  tools  of  self-regulation.  Second,  fundamental  rights  are  not  simply
constraints  for  innovation  that  aim  at  reducing  or  avoiding  its  undesirable  or  negative
consequences by warranting the respect of human health, dignity, privacy etc. Rather, they also
concern the shaping of policies,  so that rights are not only respected and protected,  but also
promoted by way of proactive initiatives: “we should allow fundamental rights to work in a truly
proactive fashion, and this is possible only in a rights based model, a system where (legal issues
on) human rights are not an accident on the route of governance, but are integrated into all its
phases from the outset” (Ruggiu 2015: p. 233). When their meaning is understood in this way,
the  reference  to  fundamental  rights  adds  a  significant  dimension  to  governance  frameworks
aimed  at  encouraging  proactive  policies,  as  they  imply  and  require  the  contribution  of
stakeholders and, in general, of the citizens in determining their content and the concrete goals to
be pursued within the innovation process.
Conclusion
RRI can be deemed as a governance approach integrating fundamental  rights with voluntary
regulatory mechanisms and instruments typical of the New Governance model. The efficacy of
this approach is based on just such an integrative nature, i.e. on the combination of principle-
based  and  outcome-oriented  regulation.  We  emphasized  fundamental  rights  as  the  main
“building blocks” of principle-based regulation and, more in general, of this framework.
The combination  of  fundamental  rights  with  soft  and hybrid  regulatory  instruments  that  are
typical of New Governance seems particularly apt to cope with the situation to which RRI is
called to answer. As we have said in the introduction, we might see the orientation provided by
the RRI approach as “a joint product of knowledge about the future and consent about the most
desired prospects”,  in a situation that can be properly characterized as uncertain in terms of
knowledge and contested in terms of consent (Douglas and Wildavsky 1983: pp. 5–6). In the
context of RRI, the reference to fundamental rights could be seen, therefore, as an important
component in the constellation of elements determining the ethical acceptability of innovation
and techno-scientific developments. This is the main reason for maintaining that, in the field of
the governance of innovation, RRI tends to be a more comprehensive approach than the New
Governance itself. In RRI, the reference to fundamental rights is one of the elements to be taken
into consideration when assessing the ethical acceptability of innovation. This situation reflects
the RRI focus on actors’  responsibilization and the appeal to their capacity of committing to
some goals beyond what is strictly mandated by the law: “Responsibilization – namely expecting
and assuming the reflexive moral capacities of various social actors – is the practical link that
connects the ideal-typical scheme of governance to actual practices on the ground. Responsibility
– in contrast to mere compliance with rules – presupposes one’s care for one’s duties and one’s
un-coerced application of certain values as a root motivation for action” (Shamir 2008, p. 7).
Our discussion suggests that the potential of fundamental rights to successfully combine a stable
normative orientation with openness and flexibility in RRI should be considered with regard to
how this commitment to fundamental rights can be properly adjusted into decentred and bottom-
up-shaped  regulation.  In  other  words,  it  is  a  matter  of  how  the  basic  requirements  of
constitutional state can be preserved in the multilevel and manifold regulation that characterizes
the New Governance approach. Indeed,  when assessing the coherence and suitability  of soft
regulation according to the framework of RRI, the relationship between the New Governance
approach and the (multilevel)  constitutional  dimension of  the  EU needs to  be addressed.  In
general, the relationships between the typical tools of New Governance have been differently
identified as characterized by complementarity, rivalry or transformation (i.e. the transformation
of legal regulation due to the influence of governance frameworks) (Trubek and Trubek 2007:
pp. 6–13). The success of referring to fundamental rights as a solution to provide “normative
anchor points” for RRI requires a careful examination of the legal and regulatory framework in
which STI activities are framed in the EU and, at the same time, a deliberate effort to construe a
governance  framework  designed  to  ensure  the  complementarity  between  hard  and  soft
regulation, legal norms and voluntary commitments.
RRI would be yet another recast of purely market-based approaches promoting an “‘economized’
language of responsibility” (Shamir 2008) instead of a “responsible” approach in the broader
sense  claimed  by RRI  (Arnaldi  and Gorgoni  2016)  if  it  is  not  backed  by strong normative
commitments towards the basic democratic values expressed by constitutionalism and the rule of
law, which do represent a fundamental,  specifically European, ethical-political  and also legal
legacy.
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7.1Table 7.1 Examples of soft regulatory initiatives
Tab. 1- Soft regulatory initiatives: somexample
Level of initiative
Initiator National/subnational International/supranational
Public Voluntary Reporting 
Scheme for Engineered 
Nanoscale Materials (UK)
EPA Nanoscale Materials 
Stewardship Program
OECD Working Party on 
Nanotechnology
European Commission 
Code of Conduct
Private Responsible Nanocode ISO TC 229 Responsible 
Care
Source: Arnaldi (2014)
7.2Table  7.2  RRI  and  the  evolution  of  responsibility  paradigms  (adapted  from  Arnaldi  and
Gorgoni 2016)
Paradigm Criterion of 
ascription
Mean of 
realization
Target Dimension Orientation in 
time
Responsibility 
dimensions
Regulating 
mechanism 
Fault Liability Sanction Negative 
outcomes
Individual Retrospective Liability-
responsibility
Hard law
Risk Damage Compensation Negative 
outcomes
Systemic Prospective/ret
rospective
Causality-
responsibility
Hard law
Safety Uncertainty Expertise Negative 
outcomes
Collective Prospective/ant
icipative (or 
preventive)
Capacity-
responsibility
Hard law/soft 
law
RRI Responsiveness Participation Negative and
positive 
outcomes
Collaborative Prospective/pro
active
Virtue-
responsibility
Self-
regulation/soft 
law/hard law
1  All the authors outlined the structure of the chapter. S. Arnaldi wrote sections 1, and 2; G. Gorgoni wrote section 4, and 5; E. Pariotti wrote sections 3, and 6; all authors wrote section 7. All 
authors have read and approved the manuscript. The materials and arguments of this chapter are based on several publications in which the Authors have discussed the links between responsibilization and 
soft regulation, as well as between RRI and fundamental rights (Arnaldi, Gorgoni, Pariotti 2016; Arnaldi and Gorgoni 2016; Arnaldi 2017).
2  For further details about these and other initiatives, see Arnaldi (2014); Arnaldi et al. (2014).
3  For the purposes of this chapter we do not differentiate between “Fundamental Rights” and “Human Rights”, although it is both possible and relevant to do it from a legal point of view, as 
they have a different legal status. The consequences of the distinction for an RRI framework are explained by Ruggiu (2015: p. 232).References
